Hermeneutic forever : voice, text, digitization, and the "I" by Ong, Walter J.
Oral Tradition, 10/1 (1995): 3-26 
 
 
 
 
Hermeneutic Forever:  
Voice, Text, Digitization, and the “I”  
 
Walter J. Ong, SJ 
 
 
1. Interpretation: Verbal and Other 
 
 Although we tend unreflectively to think of interpretation as carried 
on in language and as applied to linguistic expression in oral utterance or in 
text, interpretation can in fact be much larger than language in human life. 
  In a quite ordinary and straightforward sense, to interpret means for a 
human being to bring out for another human being or for other human beings 
(or for himself or herself) what is concealed in a given manifestation, that is, 
what is concealed in a verbal statement or a given phenomenon or state of 
affairs providing information.  We can interpret anything that provides 
information: not merely a verbal statement but also a sunset, a rumble in an 
automobile transmission, a gesture, a performance of instrumental music, a 
person’s gait.  
 The terms “concealed,” “manifestation,” and “revealed,” just used, 
betray that we are thinking of knowledge here, as is common, by analogy 
basically with the sense of vision, rather than of hearing (voice-and-ear) or 
smell or taste or the manifold senses we group under “touch” (hot-cold, wet-
dry, rough-smooth, soft-hard, resistant-yielding, and so on).  Interpretation 
could be considered with regard to knowledge conceived by analogy with 
one or another of these other senses, too, but to do so would make a long, 
long story, and we can forego such considerations here.  
 As interpretation can apply to any sort of phenomenon, so it can be 
expressed in all sorts of human ways, not merely verbal but also 
nonverbal—for example,  by raised eyebrows,  a wave of the hand, a 
thumbs-down gesture, a knowing grin, or in non-gesticulatory ways, as by a 
grumble or by the clothes one wears or by a fireworks display.  These 
nonverbal interpretations are always to some degree dependent on the 
culture in which the interpreters live, but some are also to some degree 
common to all human cultures.  Thus,  there are  different kinds of smiles 
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and the meaning of a smile may vary widely (acceptable egalitarian 
relationship, brash insolence), but there is a general sense in which, cross-
culturally, a smile is a smile, as against, for example, a frown. 
 Besides interpreting both the verbal and the nonverbal nonverbally, 
one can also interpret the verbal and the nonverbal verbally.  Typically 
(although not in every instance) verbal interpretation as such has a certain 
edge over other kinds of interpretation in that it can operate with 
incomparably more complex implications than can other forms of 
interpretation, such as, for example, gestures, which can be exquisitely 
complex but can hardly produce the equivalent of Newton’s Principia 
mathematica.  A scientist working in a laboratory normally brings the results 
of the laboratory work to a conclusion, that is, interprets them—which is not 
to say with total explicitness—not in gestures or in a show of fireworks, but 
in an article or book. 
 If the work contains elaborate graphics to clarify matters in ways 
more economical than words, nevertheless at some point or points, directly 
or indirectly, the graphics must be explained verbally—although, once 
explained, they can work exquisitely and nonverbally, through visual 
attention to the verbally explained graphics. 
 Yet, although both verbal expression and nonverbal expression can be 
interpreted verbally, neither can ever be fully interpreted verbally, for any 
verbal interpretation must be given meaning also from the nonverbal in 
which the verbal is always embedded.  This is why all texts, kept to 
themselves apart from nonverbal and nontextual context, always 
automatically deconstruct themselves.  To hold together, even as texts, they 
need not only other texts but also the nontextual.  Paolo Valesio (1986) has 
put this beautifully in the title of his brilliant book, Ascoltare il silenzio 
(Listen to the Silence), pay attention to what they are not saying but are 
simply taking for granted, and Stephen Tyler (1978) has made the point in 
another way in his book bearing the significant title, The Said and the 
Unsaid.  Any given verbal interpretation receives its meaning in part from 
accompanying nonverbalized communication—shared traditions, common 
knowledge, shared sensory experience, here-and-now personal interactions, 
and much more—in which it is embedded. 
 To put it in another way, any use of words, oral, textual, or digitized, 
is not just words but is also a speech act, and as a specifiable speech act, is 
entangled in all sorts of other nonverbal matters—these persons speaking 
and  these  listeners  listening,  the  physical  setting,  the mood (jocular, 
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half-serious, serious, uncompromising, for example), and much else.  Text 
always relies, directly or indirectly, on more than the textual.  To hold 
together, even as a text, it needs something more than text. Verbal 
interpretation as verbal is never complete.  Total verbal explicitness is 
impossible.  The definition (or interpretation) of interpretation just provided 
above itself calls for interpretation—which is not to say that we do not grasp 
it but that we do not grasp it simply through words. 
 Syntax or structure, which makes possible virtually unlimited 
complexity in relating various words/concepts, is what makes language, as 
has been known since Ferdinand de Saussure’s Cours de linguistique 
générale (1916) and as has been confirmed on sociobiological grounds by 
Bickerton (1990).  Referentiality—the use of a particular sound or sign to 
“stand for” or “represent” some specific kind of thing other than itself—is 
not restricted to full human language, Bickerton has shown.  (Even in 
common parlance, we do not say that a concept or a word “presents” 
something, but that it represents something—which was somehow present 
nonconceptually or nonverbally before it was represented.)  Even without 
human coaching, referentiality is found in the “protolanguages” of species 
such as the vervet monkey, which in the wild has separate alarm calls to 
represent respectively the python, the martial eagle, and the leopard (12-15), 
each of which was present to an individual monkey before it was represented 
by its special referent call.  But no trace of syntax or structure, including the 
simple and essential subject-predicate structure of language, has been found 
in such monkeys or in the much higher anthropoid apes (108; 13, 38-39, 97) 
even after these have been coached by humans.  It is not referentiality but 
structure or syntax, including the cardinal subject-predicate structure, that is 
distinctive of language.  Saussure had this right. 
 Language as such has always come into existence as sound 
(DeFrancis 1989, passim), and sound can be structured in illimitably 
intricate ways, as in a symphony.  But nonverbal sound, even highly 
structured nonverbal sound, does not at all have the interpretive edge over 
other modes of expression that verbalized sound (and, later verbal text) has.  
For all its musicological and psychological resonance, Sibelius’s Finlandia 
does not make Finland known in so circumstantial a way as does a history 
book about Finland, although it tells something about Finland that no words 
can express—once the hearer has been assured verbally that Finland is what 
the music is “about.” 
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 But for all the edge that verbal interpretation has over other forms of 
interpreting, it is always joined with the nonverbal in one way or another.  
As has been noted, any use of speech, any speech act, oral or written, itself is 
never free of the nonverbal.  We must be aware of the nonverbal setting as a 
whole in order to know what any given verbal expression says.  “I’m going 
to get you” can be a serious threat, a not-so-serious threat, or a playful 
expression of any number of complex relationships, depending on the 
nonverbal setting in which the words are uttered—and, as the case may be, 
also on the antecedent verbal and/or nonverbal setting as well. 
 Nevertheless, despite the fact that verbal interpretation can never be 
purely verbal, interpretation, as has been seen, reaches a certain kind of peak 
insofar as it involves words. Studies in the ethnography of speech (e.g., 
Bauman and Sherzer 1989) or in the mass media of today (e.g., Downing et 
al. 1990) show how intricate the interaction between verbal utterance and 
nonverbal context can be.  Although limited in a given instance by given 
exigencies, “context” as such for interpreting words can reach out 
indefinitely in space and in time, proximate or distant, which envelopes the 
present and which the present envelopes. Etymologies, for example, 
grounding the use of given words, can always be extended further.  They can 
be historically bottomless, which is not at all to say inaccurate or 
uninformative.  The information they supply is simply never total.  There 
can be, and are, always further roots remaining to be accessed beneath those 
that etymology has bared.  
 A true anecdote can suggest how the nonverbal and the verbal can 
intermesh.  At a meeting of the National Council on the Humanities some 
years ago, another member of the Council and a good friend, the 
distinguished director of a great municipal art gallery and thus a professional 
proponent of the visual, pulled me up on a remark I had made.  I can no 
longer recall my remark but it must have been singularly nonilluminating.  
My friend countered with, “I would like to remind Walter Ong that, as has 
so often been said, one picture is worth a thousand words.”  However stupid 
my own previous remark may have been, I could not let this remark of his 
get by.  I came back, “If that is so, why do they keep saying it?”  Why do 
they? 
 The reason of course is that, even in the case of a picture, verbal 
utterance can supply certain contexts and thus clarify elements that the 
graphic arts alone cannot clarify.  A picture can be worth more than a 
thousand words if it is set in a cultural context that is adequately verbalized, 
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often enough not simply here and now but through memories or echoes of 
centuries-old discourse.  A picture of a man with a sheep hoisted across his 
shoulders could mean a great many things.  The centuries-old discourse 
about Jesus and the lost sheep fills it with specific and complex meaning, 
inviting limitless interpretation.  But the verbalized context is itself defined 
in part extraverbally by its physical or historical setting, by cultural tradition, 
by gesture, and so on.  In the instance just cited, the context of the story of 
the lost sheep includes a setting in a pastoral culture, where sheep are central 
to the human lifeworld, not in a hunting-and-gathering culture. 
 Besides being complex and supple, verbal interpretation is curiously 
self-propagating.  For if, as has been seen, more than other sorts of 
interpretation (gesticular, and so on), verbalized interpretation moves toward 
maximized interpretation, it is at the same time never totally maximized, 
never totally completed and thus by its very existence invites further 
asymptotic movement toward completion.     
  In an asymptotic movement, the closer one gets to the objective, the 
more evident it becomes that the objective will never be reached.  In a given 
situation, interlocutors can of course come to a satisfactory and true 
conclusion, not by reason of words alone, but because the meeting of their 
minds, mutual understanding, is realized not alone through the words spoken 
but also through the nonverbal existential context, such as the unconsciously 
shared cultural or personal memories out of which and in which the words 
are spoken.  Plato notes that truth can be arrived at only after dialogue within 
long mutual acquaintanceship, “partnership in a common life” (Seventh 
Letter 341).  Words alone will not do: the unsaid, in which words are 
embedded, must be shared in interpersonal relationship.  Communication in 
words-and-context will yield truth here and now, will satisfy the demands of 
the present quest for truth even though the context and the words themselves 
are incomplete and could, of course, absolutely speaking, be subject to 
further verbalization and the grasp of truth thereby enlarged or deepened. 
 We can never understand anything to the limit.  When we are 
communicating in words, verbalization can fruitfully stop where it does in a 
given situation not because there is nothing more that could be said, but 
because, given the present verbal-plus-nonverbal situation, the total 
existential relationship between interlocutors, each side senses that the other 
is at present satisfied, so that nothing more needs to be said, even though 
explanation  could  theoretically  be  prolonged indefinitely.  A true and,  for  
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the given situation, adequate stage of explanation has been reached.  Silence 
ensues.  But the silence can later generate more words (and more silence)—
as it does in Valesio’s book, Ascoltare il silenzio.    
   
 
2. Stages of Interpretation or of Hermeneutic     
 
  In the past few decades, the Greek-based term hermeneutics or, 
alternatively, hermeneutic, with its cognates in French, German, and other 
languages, has attracted to itself discussion of the sort here carried on thus 
far with reference to the Latin-based term interpretation.  Hermeneutics is 
indeed interpretation, but commonly refers to reflective or “scientific” 
interpretation.  Reasons for the current fascination with hermeneutics will be 
touched on later.   Meanwhile, the terms can be treated together here. 
 One can divide the stages of interpretation or hermeneutic historically 
and/or cross-culturally in various ways.  The division here undertaken is one 
opened by recent studies in contrasts between oral, chirographic, 
typographic, and electronic cultures, under the following subheadings.  This 
pattern of interpretation is not preemptive or exclusive.  It is examined here 
simply for whatever it can contribute to overall understanding.     
 1. Oral interpretation of oral utterance.  It should be noted what is 
meant, and indeed what is at stake, here.  We are not concerned with “texts” 
as such at all.  In dealing with what I have elsewhere styled primary oral 
culture, a culture which has no knowledge of any sort of writing or even of 
the possibility of writing (for various movements toward writing and the 
final achievement of full writing, see DeFrancis 1989), to speak (or write) of 
an “oral text” is an anachronism.  In a primary oral culture, there can be no 
oral “text,” however we may have been addicted until recent times to think 
unreflectively of oral utterance not by examining oral cultures’ utterances as 
such but only by conceiving of them by analogy with texts, retrojecting our 
concept of an oral culture out of what is known of our own or others’ textual 
cultures.  
 It is of course true that our study of primary oral cultures involves 
texts.  For study purposes, although we can now sound-tape an oral 
performance, we commonly at some point make even the oral taped 
performance into texts, to which we can return, as we cannot to a live oral 
performance.  And, of course, although the acoustic tape can recreate the 
sound, it cannot bring back the total existential situation in which the 
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performance initially lived: this total real situation that defines orality of 
course eludes recovery.  Moreover, today’s linear, scientific or quasi-
scientific discourse about oral performance and oral culture, as about 
anything else, is dependent upon mental structures that have been made 
available by writing and which implement our thought processes (Ong 
1982).  Thus, in a deeply textualized culture study of oral performance will 
always bear some mark of the textualized mental habits of the investigators.  
But intelligence is reflective, can turn back on itself, so that, while we can 
never totally re-create a primary oral culture in our imagination or minds, we 
can approximately re-create it and be aware that our re-creation is defective 
in various ways (not all of which we are capable of specifying, although we 
may, in various inarticulate ways, register virtually all of them).  Such 
knowledge about the limitations under which we labor is the next best thing 
to not having the limitations.  And it is crucial. 
 We need to remember that, by a well warranted extrapolation from 
Gödel’s proof, any sort of closed system is impossible. Neither oral language 
nor text nor electronic “artificial intelligence” can be a closed system.  They 
are all interactive somewhere with something other than themselves.  The 
foundation of computer science, for example, as Leith (1990) has shown, is 
sociological.  (Why does one start the science with this rather than that 
question or set of questions?—No computer can respond to such a 
fundamental query, precisely because it a question arising antecedently to all 
computerization.)  Unless one wishes to suppose that computers were there 
from the beginning of Homo sapiens some 150,000 years ago (Stringer 
1990), as some want to postulate “text” was. 
 Deconstructionists and others seem surprised (and delighted—or both) 
to be able to show that texts and anything considered by analogy as a text, 
can be found never to have total internal consistency.  But this is hardly 
surprising if one notes that texts are not purely “natural” products, such as 
exhaled breath or sweat or spittle, but are technologically constructed 
systems (writing is a technology, as also, a fortiori, is print). As systems, 
they cannot be self-contained.  They are built by something outside them.  
Indeed, ceteris paribus, the same is true of oral utterance, which cannot be 
self-contained either, for it also cannot be developed into a self-contained 
system. 
 There is no evidence that either writing or the very possibility of 
writing entered human consciousness for nearly all of the approximately 
150,000 years of the existence of Homo sapiens—or,  to adopt the outer 
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limit of existence of Homo sapiens, for the possibly 500,000 years of the 
existence of the species (Stringer 1990).  We can assume, not unrealistically 
(see DeFrancis 1989), that Homo sapiens could in some way speak from the 
beginning, that speech of some sort was what constituted or made Homo 
sapiens the dominant species that we became.  Yet, although we have 
evidence of other artifacts running back tens or even hundreds of thousands 
of years, we have no evidence of writing before 5000 to 6000 years ago—a 
mere nothing in 150,000 to 500,000 years of existence.  To treat verbal 
expression for 150,000 years or more as always a “text” in the total absence 
of any such thing as a manufactured text—seems stultifying, when we now 
know in massive and circumstantial detail what differentiates the mental and 
speech activities of oral cultures from the mental and speech activities of 
writing cultures. 
 We know enough about the prechirographic, purely oral stage that has 
constituted almost all of human existence to be able to say that in oral 
culture itself all interpretation was in a certain sense ad hoc, and essentially 
dialogic, an oral exchange about an oral utterance or oral utterances.  Oral 
interpretation ultimately owed what stability it had not simply to other oral 
utterances but basically to the cultural institutions in which utterance was 
deeply embedded rather than to any extensively analytic explanation of 
anything such as textual cultures make possible (in their oral as well as in 
their textual performance).  The meaning of any word was validated by no 
textual or other record, but simply by its actual use over time in given 
situations and/or with gestures and other nonverbal signifiers (Sienaert 
1990).  You knew what the word meant from the way you had heard it 
embedded in usage, that is, in nonverbal context, perhaps mingled with the 
verbal context of other words accompanying it.  There were no definitions, 
no records of how the word had previously been used and there was no way 
to “look it up”—“look up” was an “empty” expression, totally meaningless 
and incomprehensible in purely oral culture.  Nor was there any way to 
retrieve earlier oral uses of the word in their fuller verbal and nonverbal 
contexts.  Each person assessed the meaning of each word by interpreting 
the context in which he or she encountered the word. 
 2. Textual interpretation of oral utterance.  This refers to 
interpretation of oral performance as such carried out by cultures that have 
interiorized writing, made it their own, and cultures that use print.  The 
psychodynamics of orality have been described in appreciable depth only 
beginning with the work of Marcel Jousse from 1924 on (see Sienaert 1990) 
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and with Milman Parry’s more immediately eventful collected works 
published in 1971, and are still passed over by much text-bound scholarship.  
But we do have (as in Goody 1968, Foley 1990, and many other sources) 
manuscript and printed hermeneutic of verbal performances of oral peoples 
as such, which has, of course, required intensive fieldwork, entailing, among 
other things, transcription in the field.  Such interpretation cannot be 
identical with the oral interpretation of oral speech in a primary oral culture, 
for it cannot rid itself entirely of the textual mindset with which it operates.  
But it can reflectively undercut its own textuality to an extent, undertaking to 
approximate the mindset of the oral cultures it is studying.  The problem is 
no more than the most basic problem of all history: not so much the problem 
of reconstructing past conditions out of details we have accumulated about 
them, as that of forgetting what we know that those we are studying did not 
know. 
 3. Chirographic (handwritten) interpretation of written text.  This 
exists in massive quantity from antiquity.  It is handicapped by the fact that 
manuscript texts are inherently unstable by contrast with the printed texts 
that we are used to and take for granted.  In copying previously corrected 
copies, scribes inevitably introduce new errors of their own.  Print can 
correct texts piecemeal, leaving untouched the parts of the original that are 
not to be corrected. 
 4. Printed interpretation of printed text.  Here the text dealt with in 
the verbal interpretation of the text can be to all intents and purposes stable.  
Yet interpretation here has been handicapped by limited awareness of the 
psychodynamics of oral utterance and of the effects of this psychodynamics 
on early writing, where a good deal of conspicuous “oral residue” (habits of 
mind fixed by many ages of oral performance) is detectable in printed texts 
well into the nineteenth century in the West (Ong 1967:22, e.g.). 
 By the mid-eighteenth century, after print has interiorized itself 
thoroughly in human consciousness (see Kernan 1987), so that the text, fixed 
in print to an extent unrealizable in manuscript, is felt as a physical thing 
apart from spoken words, interpretation becomes a self-conscious, semi-
scientific, reflective activity, such as we commonly today take 
“hermeneutics,” strictly so-called, to be (see below, “The Hermeneutic 
Explosion”).  The hermeneutic age begins roughly with romanticism and the 
concomitant dissolution of the centuries-old age of rhetoric, which had 
originated as a reflectively conscious “art” in the highly oral culture of 
Greek antiquity and which often enforced highly oral styles even in written 
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and printed utterance. 
 5. Electronically implemented hermeneutic of oral utterance.  This is 
managed usually by recording the oral utterance as sound, most often via 
sound tapes or, now, compact disks.  But the taped oral utterance finds itself 
inexorably transmuted into inscribed, visualized text for more intensive 
study.  Once in text, the oral utterance is read—which is to say, reconverted 
into living sound either vocally or in the imagination of the reader. 
 6. Electronically implemented hermeneutic of written or printed or 
electronically produced text.  With electronics, and particularly the 
computer, hermeneutics has entered a more intensely reflective stage than 
ever before, as greater and greater stores of information can be dealt with by 
means of more and more potent technological aids to interpretation.  The 
distance of interpretation from utterance is increased exponentially as more 
circumstantially accurate, particularized hermeneutic is spectacularly 
improved.  Computerized data bases will now, for example, give every 
instance of the use of a given key word in a computerized book text running 
to thousands of pages or even provide today every instance of the 
occurrence, with a multi-word context, of a given individual’s name in the 
New York Times of yesterday (this for all the world, via a data base located 
in Ohio).  
 Most notably, as Bolter has explained in exquisite detail in his Writing 
Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing, the computer 
produces an electronic text which is newly open and fluid, subject to 
constant supplementing and revision.  Computerized hermeneutics operates 
in and on and out of this open, electronic text.  Pictures and other graphics 
can become a part of the electronic text, a part of writing.  But in the last 
analysis, the governing structure of such hermeneutics remains verbal, as 
Bolter’s book itself shows.  The book is available in print or on computer 
diskette.  Yet in this new world of the open text, even on diskette, the verbal 
retains its primacy as explanation.  Bolter uses illustrations and graphics, but 
these are embedded in a text which is overwhelmingly verbal, even when 
including and freshly interacting with visual presentation. 
 
 
3. The Hermeneutic Explosion 
 
 Interpretation is thought of and practiced today more and more under 
the title of “hermeneutics.”  Although human beings have been interpreting 
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utterance from time immemorial, the development of hermeneutics, so 
labeled, has been a relatively recent phenomenon, following on the 
saturation of consciousness with print, which made verbalization into a fixed 
physical object as it never before had been felt to be.  A text could now be 
operated upon as a stable physical object felt as somehow distinct from the 
living, moving thought and speech performing the hermeneutic operation.  
Instead of sounds, one had a visible object that, even more in mechanically 
rigidified print than in writing, could be felt as a fixed “thing” on which 
mobile, here-and-now moving verbal hermeneutic (oral, or more often 
textual) could operate.  (One of the contributions of deconstruction and other 
recent literary theory and philosophy, has been to sound the alert that a text 
is not all that fixed a “thing.”)   Hermeneutics refers to the resulting 
systematized or methodized interpretation, felt as different from the text on 
which it “operates” even if the hermeneutic emerges as itself a text. 
“Hermeneutics,” as against “interpretation,” suggests explicit reflection 
about the interpretive process itself.  Hermeneutics is interpretation grown 
self-conscious.     
  Hermeneutics, or alternatively hermeneutic, is a relatively new term 
in English, as are its equivalents in other languages. The earliest citation of 
the English-language term in the Oxford English Dictionary (1961, rpt. 
1983) is from the year 1737, in the period when, some two centuries after its 
invention, print was taking definitive possession of human consciousness in 
the West, as Kernan (1987) has so well shown in his Printing Technology, 
Letters, and Samuel Johnson. 
 Hermeneutics as such at first addressed itself largely to biblical and 
other sacred texts, but it has now expanded far more widely.  Specialized 
hermeneutics, more or less methodical interpretive operations and theories, 
have been developed for different sorts of text—literary or poetic, political, 
philosophical, scientific, and other.  Elaborate, often deeply insightful ways 
of managing textual hermeneutics have been devised in recent times, notably 
by theologians such as Friedrich Schleiermacher, Rudolf Bultmann, and 
Jürgen Moltmann, by philosophers such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Paul Ricoeur, and by 
hosts of literary commentators, from the Formalists and the New Critics 
through the Deconstructionists.  Hans-Georg Gadamer has produced a 
magisterial treatment of the subject in his Truth and Method (1983, original 
German 1960), which has itself been subject to further hermeneutic 
processing by Joel C. Weinsheimer in his Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A 
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Reading of Truth and Method (1985).  Weinsheimer explains or interprets 
what Gadamer was doing when he was explaining or interpreting what he 
was interpreting—which was often one or another interpretation worked out 
by earlier authors. 
 But the work of these practitioners and theorists is only the tip of the 
iceberg.  In our present electronic era, the term hermeneutics has become a 
cross-disciplinary academic and intellectual buzzword.  It encompasses far 
more than interpreting simply texts.  Cruising through a university library 
catalogue, one finds endless listings of diverse hermeneutics under title 
and/or subject headings, largely from the 1970s on, such as “literary 
hermeneutics,” “hermeneutics and analysis,” “science, hermeneutics, and 
praxis,” “Buddhist hermeneutics,” “hermeneutics as method, philosophy, 
and critique,” “context and hermeneutics,” “hermeneutics, tradition, and 
reason,” “hermeneutics and deconstruction,” “hermeneutics and social 
science,” “hermeneutics as politics,” “hermeneutics of postmodernity,” 
“hermeneutics of ultimacy,” “hermeneutics versus science” (is hermeneutics 
opposed to science, allied with science or even constitutive of science, or 
simply used to explain science?), “religion, literature, and hermeneutics,” 
“feminist hermeneutics,” “philosophical hermeneutics” (is hermeneutics 
allied with philosophy, supplementary to philosophy, interwoven with 
philosophy, constitutive of philosophy?), “Yeats’s autobiography and 
hermeneutics,” “hermeneutics and the personal structure of language,” and 
so on and on. The alternative term interpretation is not uncommon, but its 
use in past or present shows nothing of the trendiness found in the use of the 
more reflectively intensive hermeneutics from the past few decades through 
the present.  The textually targeted hermeneutics, born of the study of texts, 
is evidence of the hold of the text and its intellectual accessories on the mind 
today, which has set the stage and furnished the raw material for the New 
Criticism, structuralism, and deconstruction, and doubtless will set the stage 
for much else still in the offing. 
 In his impressively comprehensive study of hermeneutics and related 
subjects just mentioned,  Truth and Method, Gadamer notes that formal 
study of what we now style hermeneutics was originally rooted in the study 
of texts and that “Schleiermacher was the first to see that the hermeneutical 
problem was not raised by written words alone, but that the oral utterance 
also presented—and perhaps in its fullest form—the problem of 
understanding” (353).  The astounding fact that,  according to Gadamer, no 
one before  Schleiermacher appeared to be aware of the need of 
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hermeneutics for interpreting oral utterance is something to reflect on in 
relation to our recent textual fixation. 
 In fact, the Greek term hermeneia refers indifferently to interpretation 
or explanation of oral utterance or text or other phenomena.  Interpretation 
or hermeneutic originated with oral utterance, but the relevance of 
interpretation or hermeneutic to oral utterance in our time grows 
anachronistically out of awareness of its relevance to texts.  This 
anachronistic cast of thinking is symptomatic of the textual bias that still 
affects study of language and thought almost everywhere—and 
understandably so, for systematic, linearly developed, abstract, scientific or 
quasi-scientific study of any kind depends on writing. There is no oral 
treatise on orality, no oral “study” of orality, and there cannot be, for there 
can be no oral treatise on anything (Havelock 1968).  All you can have—and 
this, indeed, is a lot—is oral interpretation of an always fluid sort, 
existentially meaningful (fitting into the immediate, living situation), but 
never “scientifically” controlled (that is, quasi-static). 
 The widespread and ultimately indispensable use of writing and its 
sequels, print and electronic text, ultimately established our present and 
longstanding textual bias, but it also enables us to correct our textual bias, at 
least to a degree, even though we seldom do so.  In cultures so reliant as ours 
on writing and print and now electronics, text becomes all too readily the 
model for all utterance, and eventually for all of existence.  All text, we must 
remember, is the creation not just of unaided human beings, as oral speech 
is, but of human beings plus technology, without which text is impossible. 
Relating Gadamer’s observations here to the four stages of verbal 
communication we have mentioned earlier—primary oral culture (no 
knowledge of writing or of its possibility), scribal or chirographic culture, 
print culture, and electronic culture—we can discern a profoundly 
significant sequential pattern.  (1) In primary oral cultures, interpretation 
certainly took place in oral verbal exchange, paradigmatically in a dialogic 
setting. One of Plato’s objections to writing in the Phaedrus (275) is 
precisely that it cannot interpret itself if you ask it what it means, whereas 
oral utterance can normally be interpreted by its speaker.  (2) With 
handwritten texts, interpretation becomes more urgent, precisely because 
there is no direct dialogic interaction—the writer and the reader or audience 
need not be and normally are not present to each other.  Since verbalization 
always implies dialogue, the writer and reader have always to fictionalize 
one another into a dialogue setting (Ong 1975).  (3) With the deep 
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interiorization of print in the mid-eighteenth century,  when authors could 
for the first time make their living out of producing texts for sale (earlier, 
even after print was invented, books were not priced to include royalties, so 
that writers had to have a patron or some independent source of income—
see Kernan 1987 for details), hermeneutics as a self-conscious, more or less 
systematized activity comes into its own.  (4) With the development of 
electronic communication, today hermeneutics has of course become little 
short of an obsession. Electronic texts are the product of digitization, that is, 
of fractioning, of treating everything in terms of numerically distinct units, a 
radical act of separation contrasting with the unifying drive of hermeneutics.  
We see here that interpretation becomes more and more self-conscious as the 
originally spoken word is distanced more and more from the human 
lifeworld. 
 Why is it that hermeneutics has become such an obsession precisely in 
the era of the development of electronic communication?  One reason that 
suggests itself is that electronic communication has made us into an 
information society, and information of itself says nothing unless it is 
interpreted or treated hermeneutically.  DNA carries massive “information” 
that is cogent enough in itself operationally but that “says” nothing: to be put 
into words and thought patterns it has to be interpreted, or treated 
hermeneutically by the human mind. 
 But further, a deep subconscious or unconscious compensatory 
psychological development seems to be at work here.  Computers and other 
electronic media work by fractioning.  Information in a computer has to be 
reduced to binary numerical units, 0 and 1. For computerization is now 
virtually all digital: early analogue computers are mostly outmoded.  Binary 
digitization, like all digitization, breaks everything apart, but into more and 
more infinitesimal pieces until the breaks are so tiny that they can in effect 
be disregarded. 
 Nevertheless,  the breaks are there and always will be, as Leith, 
among others,  has made clear.  While hermeneutics can and does profit 
from use of digitization in computers,  it also moves in the opposite 
direction,  away from digital breakdown.  Hermeneutics, interpretation, 
seeks ultimately not to divide but to integrate.   Hermeneutics operates on 
the deep underlying principle that everything is related to everything else.  
By relating one thing to another, and, in intent if not in actual achievement, 
ultimately relating everything to everything else—for example, explaining 
the past by the present and  the present by the past and otherwise utilizing 
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the “hermeneutic circle”—its implicit ambition is ultimately to connect all 
things in consciousnesses to one another in the unbroken web of history out 
of which all experience of anything and everything emerges—William 
James’s “big, blooming, buzzing confusion” that impacts the newborn 
infant.  We can live with digitization (which is disguisedly but always 
radically incomplete, even when entirely adequate) because we have 
hermeneutics (though it also is always incomplete): the two are complete 
and incomplete in different and complementary ways. 
 Compared to one another, the present-day preoccupation with 
digitization, in the computer and elsewhere, and the present-day 
preoccupation with hermeneutics thus appear to be psychologically 
complementary.  Both preoccupations are in evidence across the world in 
varying degrees, most notably in industrialized societies.  It appears that we 
can live with digital fractioning (dehumanizing in itself) because we are 
involved so deeply in the humanizing effort of hermeneutics.  Never have 
communications media been given to such detailed interpretation of their 
own meaning and impact, humanizing and dehumanizing, as in our 
digitizing society.  One need only scour through the subject headings in a 
library catalogue for recent titles featuring “communication” and 
“communications” to see the state of affairs.  Isocrates and Plato and 
Socrates and Aristotle are far from neglected today.  We have more 
knowledge of them than ever. As a result their thought is digested and 
interwoven with and even smothered by ongoing interpretations of 
interpretations of interpretations of their work and that of others. 
 In sum, although digitization, as a fractioning enterprise, and 
hermeneutics, as a holistic or totalizing enterprise, are opposed to one 
another, they are also complementary.  That is, digitization can serve 
hermeneutic.  The vast net of textual hermeneutic with which the scholar is 
surrounded today could not have been woven and could not be maintained 
without the use of digitizing technology.  And without hermeneutic, which 
tells us what digitization means and relates digitization to things outside 
itself, digitization is only gibberish.  Hence the multifarious works 
interpreting computers and the specific characteristics and meanings of the 
texts they produce. 
 The highly reflective self-conscious rhetorical cultures of the West 
from classical antiquity through the nineteenth century cannot begin to 
match the self-conscious reflectiveness concerning communications that 
marks our present age, when thousands of new books on communications in 
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its verbal and multifarious other forms are published every year to serve the 
internet of communication departments and research centers, as well as 
innumerable individuals across the world.     
 
 
4.  All Utterance Is Interpretive or Hermeneutic 
 
 If we take interpretation (or self-conscious interpretation, which is 
styled hermeneutic) in a quite ordinary and straightforward sense, so that 
interpretation, as here indicated at the start, means for a human being to 
bring out for another or others (or for himself or herself) what is concealed 
in a given manifestation, it appears evident that all use of language is 
interpretive or hermeneutic.  Interpretation or hermeneutic makes manifest 
something (perhaps highly controversial or ironic) that was not evident 
before the interpretation or hermeneutic was provided.  And of course it also 
simultaneously conceals something. All explanation or hermeneutic warrants 
further explanation or hermeneutic, including this explanation or 
hermeneutic being provided here.  Again, total verbal explicitness is 
impossible.  As has been indicated earlier, hermeneutic or explanation stops 
not when there is nothing left to be explained but when, for present 
purposes, in this given existential situation, nothing further is felt to be 
necessary.  Thus the papers being delivered at the meetings of learned 
societies stop when they do. 
 Awareness that all use of language is interpretative or hermeneutic 
connects with the awareness that truth can never be simply propositional, as 
the Ramist and Cartesian drive in Western noetics had commonly supposed 
or implied.  Every propositional truth is limited in explicitness and thus 
demands interpretation.  Every statement is embedded in history, nonverbal 
history even more than verbal history.  As has just been stated, total verbal 
explicitness is impossible. 
 In this last statement, for example, I have not made verbally clear 
what is meant by “explicitness.”  But hearers can sense quite adequately 
what is meant.  The Latin explicare, from which we derive our explicit, 
means to unfold, as a piece of cloth or papyrus.  We readily sense the 
analogy between unfolding and verbal explanation, but no one can give an 
absolutely total philosophical and/or phenomenological account of exactly 
what the details of this analogy come to, no more no less.  We need not be 
entirely explicit about explicitness.  For we get the sense of the statement 
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that totally verbal explicitness is impossible from more than just the words 
in the statement.  We sense the analogy from our experience of the world 
around us, and that suffices in a given case. 
 The truth of the most clear-cut proposition is never within the words 
alone, but in the words-plus-existential-context.  As the earlier mentioned 
title of Paolo Valesio’s (1986) book puts it, Ascoltare il silenzio (that is, 
Listen to the Silence, or Listen to What They Are Not Saying, so as to 
understand what they are saying), and Tyler’s (1978) earlier cited title, The 
Said and the Unsaid, recommends similar cautions.  The tremendous shared 
experience out of which two persons with a shared cultural background 
make their utterances is what gives them the full sense of the utterances—
which would be puzzling or utterly incomprehensible to persons without the 
shared experience.  This is why persons of utterly diverse cultural 
backgrounds often find it hard or impossible to understand what each other 
are saying. 
 
 
5. Textual Bias,  Fundamentalisms, and the “I” 
 
 Textual bias, proneness to identify words with text and only the text, 
encourages religious fundamentalists, cultural fundamentalists, and other 
fundamentalists, but also perhaps most persons, declared fundamentalists or 
not,  in a culture so addicted to literacy as that of the United States, to 
believe that truth,  of various sorts or even of all sorts, can be neatly 
enclosed in a proposition or a limited set of propositions that are totally 
explicit and self-contained, not needing or indeed even tolerating any 
interpretation.  This runs contrary to Gödel’s theorem, earlier mentioned, 
which in essence, shows that a self-contained system—mathematical in 
Gödel’s proof, but by extension, a self-contained noetic system of any sort—
is impossible.  Any purportedly closed system is bound to contain 
unresolved oppositions.  Every utterance in a purportedly closed system 
ultimately has to be supported somehow, directly or indirectly, from the 
outside. 
 In the case of Christian fundamentalists, for example, what they 
commonly may not advert to is the biblical statement of Jesus’s: “I am the 
way and the truth and the life” (John 14.6). Jesus leaves his followers no list 
of a given number of propositional statements that total up all that he comes 
to utter as the Word of God.  There is no way even for the Word of God to 
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do this.  In Christian teaching, full truth reaches beyond, transcends any 
propositional statement.  This statement by Jesus reaches beyond itself, via 
the personal “I,” to indicate that full truth, self-contained truth is not a 
statement at all, but is nothing less than a person. 
 The person not only of Jesus, for a believer, but the person of every 
human being, for believers and nonbelievers, lies in a way beyond statement.  
The “I” that any one of us speaks lies beyond statement in the sense that 
although every statement originates, ultimately, from an “I,” no mere 
statement can ever make clear what constitutes this “I” as against any other 
“I” spoken by any other human being. 
 “I” is not a name.  “I” is not a noun, but a pronoun, something in place 
of a noun or name (Latin pro, “in place of”), for the person uttering “I” can 
be referred to by various nouns or names: a human being, a woman or a 
man, a Vietnamese, a Canadian, an athlete, Margaret, James, and so on.  (In 
English the words name and noun derive from the same Indo-European root.  
Latin uses the same word, nomen, to mean either a name or, grammatically, 
a noun.)   
 Names are always given or applied to what they refer to.  No thing 
and no person comes equipped with a name.  Names come from the outside.  
A name is either “given” to a person or thing, or, in the case of a person, 
may be “taken” by the person.  No person is born with any name at all.  
Nothing in the universe comes fitted with a name: every name is exterior to 
what it denotes. Because it is something applied from the outside, in slang 
parlance a name, especially a personal name, is readily called and sensed as 
a “handle.”  As a “handle,” a name makes it possible to manipulate what it is 
attached to. 
 The “I” that a person utters is not given to the person at all, as his or 
her name is.  Unlike one’s name, the “I” comes from the inside, from the 
interior of the person uttering it and has its referentiality in terms of an 
interior.  “I” expresses itself by uttering or “outering” itself from inside 
consciousness (utter is etymologically a variant of outer).  Here, in the case 
of the “I,” what the “handle” would be attached to somehow eludes the reach 
of the one using the “handle.”  The “I” is precisely too interior to be 
accessed by any “handle.” 
 The “I” that one person speaks sounds just like the “I” that another 
person speaks.  There is no way to express  externally what differentiates 
any one “I” from any other “I.”  Individuals can be differentiated by their 
names, once they have been given  names, which, as has been seen, are 
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external “handles,” appendages fastened on from the outside.  “I” is a 
pronoun, something in place of a noun (Latin pro, “in place of”). Since each 
utterly different person uses the same sounded or textualized “I” (or its 
equivalent in whatever language is being spoken), what a particular “I” 
refers to is actually known only as a particular presence of a particular 
interior (but outwardly directed) consciousness.  The presence of one person 
is utterly different from the presence of another person. 
 Here is the paradigm of all sense of “presence”: the presence of one 
person to another person or other persons.  A nonhuman animal, and a 
fortiori nonliving thing, is not a “presence” to a human being in the way 
another human being is.  As compared to what we sense face-to-face with 
another human being, we all know the emptiness that stares out from an 
animal’s eye.1     
 The “I” that each of the billions of persons in the world utters is each 
one’s own, as a name never is, because the “I” emerges from inside the 
person himself or herself, from inside his or her own interior consciousness, 
where no other human being exists. 
 No one else can say “I” and make it mean what it means when I say 
“I.”  When you try, saying “I am speaking of what you mean when you say 
‘I,”’ In “what you mean when you say ‘I’,” your word that refers directly to 
me is not the “I” but the “you.” 
 “You” is similarly not a name applied from outside.  It is felt by the 
interlocutor as belonging to the interior of the one the “I” is addressing.  
“You” indicates that the person who utters it is in some kind of immediate 
psychological contact with the person to whom “you” refers, a contact 
inaccessible simply with names (nouns). 
 Because “I” and “you” are utterly unlike the rest of discourse, when a 
name for the particular “I” or “you” occurs appositively in a text, it is set off 
with commas (or in oral discourse,  with changes of pitch and pauses): “I, 
Mary, certify to you, John, that my statement is true.”  Somehow, “I” and 
“you” establish a level of discourse in which names referring to the “I” 
and/or “you” are an intrusion.  “I” and “you” operate in a special and deeper 
way because of their source or grounding in the human interior, which is not 
accessed by a name. 
 Linguistically “I” and “you” are referred to as “floaters”: “I” means 
whoever says it, “you” means whoever is being addressed. “I” and “you” are  
                                                           
 1 Fuller discussion in Ong 1967:298-308, etc. 
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not nouns but pronouns, name substitutes.   As words, “I” and “you” are not 
of themselves attached to any designatable object or person other than the 
person by whom or to whom they here and now happen to be “uttered” (or 
“outered,” as noted above).   There are other “floaters” in language, all of 
them determined by their reference, direct or indirect, to the ambiance of a 
particular “I” or “you,” expressing something by reference to the 
individual’s own personal world or awareness: for example, here, now, then, 
there, soon, and so on. 
 The most radically unambiguous words in any language are the words 
for “I” and “you,” as spoken in direct dialogue.  “I” and “you,” or their 
equivalents in any language, do not demand or indeed tolerate interpretation 
or hermeneutic.  Either you “get” them, make the connection with them, or 
you do not.   When I say “I” and you fail to connect, I might undertake some 
maneuvers, verbal or other, to enable to you “connect” with me, but I have 
no way to give you an interpretation or a hermeneutic of what the “I” might 
“mean.” 
 Discourse founded in the direct relationship of “I” and “you” (singular 
sense, formerly expressed by “thou”) represents a different level of discourse 
from that where only nouns (representing not persons directly, but things, 
and persons only indirectly) are in control, as Martin Buber decades ago 
made clear in his I and Thou (1923). 
 Since each “I” must sense the “you” whom the “I” addresses before 
speech begins, dialogue demands, paradoxically enough, that the persons 
addressing one another be somehow aware of the interior of each other 
before they can begin to communicate verbally.  Although we have no way 
of retrieving the point in human history at which the first words or words 
were spoken, we can be quite sure of certain underlying features that speech 
possesses from the beginning.  In verbal communication, the hearer must be 
aware that the speaker intends the utterance to be a word or words and not 
just noise; the speaker must know that the hearer knows this, and the hearer 
must know that the speaker knows that he or she (the hearer) knows it.  The 
hermeneutic circle again. We are somehow inside one another’s 
consciousnesses before we begin to speak to another or others.  
 Otherwise, there is no way to say anything.  
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 6. A Note on Fingers and Digits 
 
 Digitization means treatment of data in terms of numerically distinct 
units.  A digit today commonly means a numerical unit such as digitization 
employs—in computer programs 0 and 1. The English digitization and digit 
both derive from the Latin term digitus, which means a finger or a toe, as the 
English term digit still does at times.     
  In many, though not all, cultures, the child uses his or her own fingers 
and/or toes to learn counting, that is, digitization. Reflection on the 
etymologies of the words digit, digitize, and their cognates and on the 
structure of fingers and toes shows how digitization is grounded in the 
human lifeworld in a remarkably human way.  The fingers and/or toes are 
separate from one another at their tips, but part of you at their bases.  Using 
fingers and/or toes, the infant, fearful of separation, as is well known, in his 
or her initially and provisionally intact world of infant-and-mother, can 
count effectively and with some security because, so clearly separated at 
their tips, the fingers and toes are securely attached to the body and 
manipulable.  It is common with children counting with their fingers or toes 
to touch each of them successively.  This reassures the child that the neatly 
tip-separated digits are still theirs, part of themselves somehow, not 
threatening total dismemberment or disintegration. 
 This human rooting of digitization is never quite eliminated:  Leith 
(1990) has shown how the ultimate starting point for computerization is not 
abstract but concretely sociological, as has been noted earlier.  A computer 
program begins with a decision to start this way rather than that way, with 
this question rather than that question—a decision made and formulated in 
the human lifeworld, not within a computer.  Computers, after all, do not 
breed themselves.  They come out of the human lifeworld, are tools, 
extensions of human beings (not vice versa).  Computers are artificial, but in 
being so are eminently human.  For there is nothing more natural to human 
beings than to be artificial.  Digits start by being connected with the person. 
 
Saint Louis University 
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